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I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")' protects
individuals with disabilities from discrimination in almost every aspect
of their lives. The intent of the ADA is to prevent day-to-day
discrimination against these individuals 2 by legislating a comprehen-
sive social policy that prohibits discrimination because of the presence
or record of a disability, society's attitudes about disabilities, or
physical barriers. Thus, to the degree that is reasonably possible,
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.
IV 1992).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1992).
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the ADA attempts to provide equal opportunity and equal treatment
to individuals with disabilities. In an effort to achieve this equality,
the ADA imposes on entities subject to its provisions not only an
obligation not to discriminate because of a disability, but also an
obligation to provide reasonable accommodation for the individual's
disability, unless providing such accommodation would impose undue
hardship.
The ADA substantially adopts the provisions of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973, 3 which has protected individuals with disabilities
from discrimination for the past twenty-one years, but the ADA
goes further in terms of who is subject to its provisions and who
is protected by it. Specifically, under Sections 501 and 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act, federal government agencies and federal con-
tractors, respectively, are prohibited from discriminating against job
applicants and employees with disabilities. Additionally, under Sec-
tion 504, agencies or entities receiving federal funding are prohibited
from discriminating against individuals with disabilities not only in
employment, but also in participation in those agencies' or entities'
programs or activities. Under the ADA, a much broader group of
entities, public and private, are prohibited from discriminating on
the basis of a disability. Thus, while the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
and other preexisting federal and state laws protecting individuals
with disabilities are still in effect, the ADA will have substantially
greater impact. At the state level, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of
1993 also recognizes the right of "an otherwise qualified person to
be free from discrimination because of ... the presence of any
sensory, mental, or physical disability . . ." in various settings, in-
cluding employment. 4
The stated purposes of the ADA are to provide a national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities; to provide clear, strong, consistent, and enforceable
standards; to ensure a central role for the federal government in
enforcing the act; and to use the regulation of commerce to protect
persons with disabilities from discrimination.5
To achieve these purposes, the ADA covers employment; 6 serv-
ices and programs of state and local governments and their instru-
mentalities; 7 services by most public transportation providers;
8
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
4. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105 (Michie Supp. 1993).
5. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), Sec. l(b)(1); ADA § 2(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (Supp. IV 1992).
6. ADA, Title I, §§ 101-08, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. IV 1992); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1993).
7. ADA, Title II, §§ 201-46, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (Supp. IV 1992). Under
1994]
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commercial facilities, public accommodations, and services; 9 and
telecommunications. 0
The ADA is unquestionably the most sweeping piece of civil
rights legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because, for the
first time, federal law protects individuals with disabilities against
discrimination on the basis of their disability. This protection is
comparable to that extended to minority groups since 1964. In fact,
it has been suggested that the ADA has created a new "suspect
class" for purposes of claims under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Con-
stitution." Whether or not these individuals represent a "suspect
class," it is clear that they do represent a significant and important
segment of this country's society. This new class is estimated to be
comprised of 43,000,000 individuals with one or more physical or
mental disabilities, or roughly twenty percent of the population of
the United States.' 2
All the provisions of the ADA are important. However, the
requirements in Title I, which prohibit discrimination in employment,
are probably the most significant because of their impact on both
of the groups affected: individuals with disabilities and employers.
Title II, a qualified individual with a disability is protected from exclusion from
the benefits of services, programs, or activities provided by public entities. Public
transportation systems operated by state and local governments and associated
public transportation authorities are also required to make vehicles and other facilities
accessible to persons with disabilities.
8. ADA, Title II, Subtitle B, §§ 221-46, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12165 (Supp. IV
1992), applies to publicly operated transportation; ADA, Title III, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12181-12189 (Supp. IV 1992) applies to private carriers.
9. ADA, Title III, §§ 301-310, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (Supp. IV 1992).
"Public accommodations" such as public lodgings, public transportation stations,
restaurants and bars, stores, service establishments, shelters and care centers, and
places of amusement, public gathering, and recreation are prohibited from dis-
criminating against individuals with disabilities. Any public transportation provided
by private entities must also be in compliance with this title, and those entitites
must make their facilities accessible to individuals with disabilities or make equivalent
services available to them.
10. ADA, Title IV, §§ 401-402. Section 401 adds language to Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (Supp. IV 1992), and directs
telecommunications providers to offer relay services to enable individuals who are
hearing or speech-impaired to communicate by telephone by means of "TDDs"
(telecommunications device for the deaf).
11. John Parry, Overview [of the Americans with Disabilities Actl in THE
AMERICANs WITH DlsAaiLrrms ACT MANUAL. 1992, at 4 (A.B.A. Commission on
Mental and Physical Disability Law). Courts, however, have thus far been reluctant
to consider individuals with disabilities as a "suspect class." See, e.g., More v.
Farrier, 984 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting argument that inmates who used
wheelchairs were a suspect class).
12. S. 933, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989), Sec. 2(a)(l). See also John T. Shannon,
Americans with Disabilities Act: A New Era in Employment Practices, ARK. LAW.,
Apr. 1991, at 35.
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For individuals with disabilities, Title I is the most significant because
it is through employment that their self-confidence, self-esteem, and
independence might be enhanced by realizing that they, too, are
contributing to society. For employers, Title I is also significant
because it will cover an estimated 666,000 employers.' 3 In addition,
Title I creates major changes in employer and employee relations
generally, and particularly in hiring practices, which will require
employers to educate themselves on the intricacies of the law. Finally,
Title I imposes an obligation on employers to provide reasonable
accommodations for job applicants and employees with disabilities.
While all of these accommodations will require some administrative
and operational adjustments, not all of them will result in financial
outlays. For those that will, however, the cost could be significant.
The impact of Title I is evidenced by the high number of recent
employment discrimination charges received by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the federal agency en-
forcing Title I. As of July 1993, one year after the effective date
of Title I, the EEOC reported that it had received 12,000 complaints
from individuals with disabilities alleging violations of Title I. Some
commentators have estimated that this figure surpasses the number
of complaints filed by women and minorities in the first year after
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became effective.14
Title I of the ADA unquestionably affects workers' compensation
law, but the extent of its impact is not entirely clear. Four specific
areas of concern can be identified: first, whether the restrictions
imposed on employers by Title I on investigating a job applicant's
physical and mental condition and qualifications prevent employers
from determining whether an applicant may be a potential "Second
Injury Fund" claimant; second, whether, in view of these same
restrictions, employers can still investigate a job applicant's condition
in sufficient depth to preserve the defense of "misrepresentation;"
third, whether an "injured worker" or a "worker with a disability'
13. R. Lee Creaseman, Jr. & Patricia Greene Butler, Will the Americans with
Disabilities Act Disable Employers?, 42 LAB. L.J. 52, 52 n.4 (1991) (citing N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 17, 1989, at E5).
14. The most common types of charges alleged in the complaints were as follows:
Discharged from work because of disability (48%); employer failed to provide
reasonable accommodations (2201o); disability prevented worker from getting job
(13%); harassed because of disability (10%); unfairly disciplined because of disability
(7.20o); and denied benefits because of disability (3.6%).
The most common types of disabilities found in these charges were as follows:
Back impairment (18%); mental illness (9.8%); heart impairment (4.3%1o); neuro-
logical impairment (3.7%); and diabetes (3.6%). Liz Spayd, The Disabilities Act,
One Year Later, WASH. PosT, July 29, 1993, at A23.
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under workers' compensation is also "a qualified individual with a
disability" for purposes of Title I of the ADA and, thus, entitled
to protection from discrimination on the basis of that disability;
and, fourth, whether the ADA preempts the "exclusive remedy"
provision of workers' compensation laws.
This article attempts to address these four areas by analyzing
the effect of the hiring practices mandated by Title I on "Second
Injury Fund" cases and the misrepresentation defense; by examining
employers' obligations to provide reasonable accommodations to
employees injured on the job and returning injured workers; and
by interpreting the interplay of exclusivity clauses of workers' com-
pensation laws and Title I.
Section II of this article discusses the definitions of key terms
in Title I. Section III will discuss the impact of Title I on hiring
practices, specifically the two-step job application process mandated
by the ADA. Section IV will analyze the importance of this two-
step application process and address the terms "disability," "qual-
ified individual with a disability," and "reasonable accommodations"
in the context of workers' compensation. Finally, Section V will
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of Title I.
II. KEY TERMS IN TITLE I OF THE AmERICANS WITH DIsABILITrEs
ACT OF 1990 (ADA)
Title I prohibits employers from discriminating against a qual-
ified individual with a disability on the basis of that disability.
Furthermore, employers are required to provide equal opportunities
to otherwise qtralified individuals with disabilities by making rea-
sonable accommodation for an individual's disability, unless these
accommodations would create an undue hardship on the employer.
One must study these terms carefully to fully understand the breadth
OJL LIIV Law.
A. Employers
Title I covers employers, employment agencies, labor
organizations, and joint labor-management committees." The ADA
defines an employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting
interstate commerce and who employs fifteen' 6 or more people for
15. ADA § 101(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(b)
(1993).
16. For employers of 25 or more employees, the ADA became effective on July
26, 1992. For employers of 15 or more employees, the ADA became effective on
July 26, 1994. ADA § 101(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (Supp. IV 1992), 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(e) (1993).
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each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year. The term "employer" also includes
agents of employers; 17 this not only imposes individual liability upon
officers and supervisors for their own discriminatory acts as agents
of the corporate employer, but also creates corporate liability for
the employer. Furthermore, employment agencies are considered to
be "third-party contractors" under a provision that prohibits
discrimination by "participating in a contractual or other arrangement
or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's
qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination
prohibited by this title."' 8
Title I does not apply to the federal government as an employer
(which is covered under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973'9), tax exempt private clubs, or Indian Tribes.20
B. Discrimination
Title I of the ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating
against a qualified individual with a disability in any term or condition
of employment, solely on the basis of that disability. "Term or
condition of employment" includes application, recruitment, hiring,
promotions, layoffs, compensation, leaves of absence, job assignments,
selection and financial aid for training programs, advancement,
discharge, employer-sponsored social and recreational activities, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of that person's employment. 2'
As examples of these terms and conditions, Title I includes the
following seven actions by employers 22 that would constitute
discrimination under the above general prohibition:
1. Limiting, segregating, or classifying job applicants or
employees in a way that adversely affects applicants' or employees'
opportunities or status;23
17. ADA § 101(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e)
(1993).
18. ADA § 102(a)-(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). Regu-
lations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
state that the ADA prohibits discrimination in recruitment, advertising, and job
application procedures. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(a) (1993).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 701-797 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
20. ADA § 101(5)(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(b) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(e)(2) (1993).
21. ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4
(1993).
22. ADA § 102(b)(1)-(7), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.4 to .11 (1993).
23. ADA § 102(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
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2. participating in a contractual or other arrangement or
relationship that subjects a covered employee or applicant to
discrimination prohibited by the ADA;24
3. utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration
that have the effect of, or perpetuate, discrimination; 2
4. denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual
because that individual associates with someone who has a known
disability; 26
5. failing to make reasonable accommodations to known
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual, unless the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of the business of the entity;27
6. using selection criteria that screen out an individual with a
disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the criteria
are job-related and are consistent with business necessity; 2 and
7. failing to select and administer employment tests in the most
effective manner to ensure that the test results accurately reflect
whatever factors the tests purport to measure, rather than reflecting
the individual's disability. 29
The fundamental requirement of Title I is only that employers
not discriminate; they are not required to prefer an individual with
a disability over an equally qualified or better qualified individual
without a disability.3 0 Because Title I prohibits discrimination against
only individuals with disabilities, however, -an employer could
theoretically hire only disabled individuals to the exclusion of other
qualified individuals without disabilities. 3
C. Qualified Individual with a Disability
Title I of the ADA states that a "qualified individual with a
disability" may not be discriminated against on the basis of that
24. ADA § 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
25. ADA § 102(b)(3)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
26. ADA § 102(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1992).
27. ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
28. ADA § 102(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. IV 1992).
29. ADA § 102(b)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1992); see also 3A
ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, § 108A.41 (1993);
Parry, supra note 11, at 5.
30. 3A LARSON & LARSON, supra note 29, § 108A.41.
31. 3A LARSON & LARSON, supra note 29, § 108A.41. In contrast to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the ADA does not have "reverse discrimination"
protection. 3A LARSON & LARSON, supra note 29, § 108A.41; see ADA § 102(a);
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
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disability.3 2 A "qualified individual with a disability" is an individual
with a disability who has the requisite skill, experience, education,
and other job-related requirements of the position he is seeking, and
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the position that the individual seeks.33 "Essential
functions" are those job duties that are fundamental to the position
as opposed to those responsibilities that are marginal.34 The ADA
does not specifically define the meaning of "essential functions,"
but the regulations promulgated by the EEOC provide some guidance. 5
The regulations state that the employer must demonstrate that the
function is essential to the job.36 However, courts give consideration
to employers' judgment regarding the essential functions of the job.37
Although a court determines what is essential on a case-by-case basis,
the regulations specifically mention three indicators:
1. Does the position exist to perform one job function and is
that particular function the one which is being evaluated?3"
2. Are there only a limited number of employees available
who can perform the function?39
3. Does the function require special expertise? 40
32. ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
33. ADA § 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. IV 1992); see also 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(M) (1993).
One commentator has proposed that notwithstanding the protection given to
individuals with disabilities by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the ADA, the
law continues to resist assimilation of those individuals into employment positions
with a level of economic equality because of the requirement, under both laws,
that the individual be able to perform the essential functions of the job involved.
See W. Robert Gray, The Essential Functions Limitation on the Civil Rights of
People with Disabilities and John Rawls, Concept of Social Justice, 22 N.M. L.
REv. 295, 296-97 (1992). According to the commentator, under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
national origin, sex, or age, the main obstacles to the full enjoyment of rights are
irrational stigmas and social stereotypes. Id. at 296. Once these social barriers are
removed, the individuals to be protected presumably become like any other persons
in the workforce and are evaluated and accepted without further obstacles. Id. By
contrast, for individuals with a disability, even after social stereotypes or other
artificial barriers are removed, an individual still must be able to perform the
essential functions of the job. Id. at 296-97. These essential job functions involve
the "nonstereotypical, natural, and thus physical requirements that a person with
a disability must be able to meet or perform to attain equality." Id. at 297.
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (1993).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i) (1993); see also ADA § 1081(8), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8) (Supp. IV 1992).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i) (1993).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii) (1993).
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(iii) (1993).
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If the answer to any of these questions is yes, the function is
likely to be considered essential. 4 ' In addition, a court may consider
other relevant factors in determining whether a function is "essential."
Among these elements are the employer's judgment, the amount of
time an employee must spend performing that function, the
consequences of not requiring the person who previously held the
job to perform the function, the terms of any applicable collective
bargaining agreement, the work experience of persons who have
previously held that job, and the work experience of persons holding
similar jobs.42 Finally, written job descriptions prepared before
advertising for or interviewing job applicants are considered evidence
of the essential functions of the job.43
D. Disability
The ADA uses the term "disability" rather than "handicap,"
which had been used in prior federal legislation such as the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, to describe individuals with disabilities.
Both terms have basically the same definition, but the drafters of
the ADA chose the term "disability" due to the possible negative
connotations attached to the word "handicap.""
The ADA defines "disability" as:
1) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of an individual; or
2) a record of a physical or mental impairment; or
3) being regarded as having a physical or mental impairment. 45
Thus, Congress has effectively given the term "disability" three
separate definitions. To seek protection under the ADA, an individual
must only show that one of the three components applies to him
or her.46
The following is an explanation of what each of the three
definitions is meant to cover.
41. Parry, supra note 11, at 25.
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.Z(n)(3)(i), (iii)-(vii) (1993); see generally Parry, supra note
11, at 24-25.
43. ADA § 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(n)(3)(ii) (1993). See also Peter M. Panken, The Disabled and Work, ALI-
ABA COURSE OF STUDY ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION, n.3 (1992).
44. 3A LARSON & LARSON, supra note 29, § 108A.31(b).
45. ADA § 3(2)(A)-(C), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (Supp. IV 1992).
46; 3A LARSON & LARSON, supra note 29, § 108A.31(b). See also Mary E. Ingley
& Barbara L. Kornblau, Workers' Compensation and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 66 FLA. B.J. 77, 77 (June 1992).
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1. "A Physical or Mental Impairment that Substantially
Limits One or More of the Major Life Activities of an
Individual."
a. Physical or Mental Impairment
This phrase encompasses:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense
organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities. 4
Because these terms are identical to those contained in the
Rehabilitation Act, precedent under that act should be helpful in
determining whether a court will consider a particular condition to
fall within this definition.a
b. "Substantially Limits"
This term qualifies "impairment" to ensure that individuals
covered by the ADA will be only those individuals whose impairment
has affected their lives to the extent that it is disabling, without
regard to whether the impairment is corrected or reduced through
medication or prosthetic devices. 49 According to ADA regulations,
an impairment substantially limits an individual when it renders that
person:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major
life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration
under which the average person in the general population can
perform that same major life activity.50
Factors to be used in determining whether an impairment is
substantially limiting include:
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2) (1993).
48. 3A LARSON & LARSON, supra note 29, § 108A.31(c)(i).
49. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1993).
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii) (1993).
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(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment;
(iii) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent
or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment."
A disability that "substantially limits" one's ability to work
significantly restricts the person's ability to perform a class of jobs
or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities.
5 2
The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute
a substantial limitation in working under the ADA.53
c. "Major Life Activities"
This term includes functions such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working. 4
2. "A Record of Such Impairment"
This second meaning in the definition of "disability" applies
to an individual who "has a history of, or has been misclassified
as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities." 55 This probably means that having
a history of a disability will constitute a disability under the ADA.5 6
3. "Being Regarded as Having Such Impairment"
An individual can satisfy this third definition by showing that
his employer's action was based on a perception of disability grounded
in myth, fear, or stereotype. Therefore, this definition "applies to
deci-ions based upon unsubstantiated concerns about productivity,
safety, insurance, liability, attendance, costs of accommodation,
accessibility, workers' compensation costs or acceptance by co-workers
and customers." 57
51. Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii).
52. Id. § 1630.20)(3)(i).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1630.2(i).
55. Id. § 1630.2(k).
56. Ingley & Kornblau, supra note 46, at 77.
57. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MAN-
TJAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE 1) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT, at II-11 (January 1992) (emphasis added) [hereinafter TAM].
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In addition to those individuals who qualify under one of the
three definintions of "disability," the ADA extends protection to
the following individuals:
4. Individuals Who Associate with Individuals with
Disabilities
Significantly, Title I of the ADA protects individuals from
associational discrimination. This means that it is illegal to deny
equal treatment or opportunities or both to qualified individuals
because of a known relationship or association with an individual
with a known disability." For example, an employee who is otherwise
qualified and performs his job satisfactorily may not be discharged
because his wife has tuberculosis.
5. Users of Illegal Drugs and Alcohol
The ADA also protects individuals suffering from drug addiction
and alcoholism;5 9 however, it allows employers to institute internal
policies that seek to ensure a workplace that is free from the illegal
use of drugs and the use of alcohol. In addition, the act allows
employers to promulgate policies that are required for compliance
with other applicable federal laws and regulations. 6°
With regard to the illegal use of drugs, it is not unlawful for
an employer to discharge or deny employment to current users of
illegal drugs on the basis of such drug use, because current users
of illegal drugs are not "qualified individuals with disabilities" under
the ADA.6' "Illegal use" means the use, possession, or distribution
of drugs that is unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act. 62 It
also means the use of illegal drugs and illegal prescription drugs
that are "controlled substances." The term "illegal use" does not
include the use of drugs taken under supervision of a licensed health
care professional, including experimental drugs for individuals with
AIDS, epilepsy, or mental illness. 63 An individual qualifies as a
current user when that individual undergoes a drug test and tests
positive for the illegal use of drugs and controlled substances. 64 By
58. ADA § 102(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1992).
59. ADA § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
60. ADA § 104(c)(1)-(5), 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(1)-(5) (Supp. IV 1992).
61. ADA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
62. ADA § 101(6)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
63. Id.
64. See generally TAM, supra note 57, Drug and Alcohol Abuse, at VIII-2 to
VIII-3.
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contrast, former drug users or addicts, who are receiving treatment
for drug addiction or who have been successfully rehabilitated, are
protected by the ADA from discrimination on the basis of past
drug addiction. 65
With regard to alcoholism, the fact that a person currently uses
alcohol does not mean that he is automatically denied protection
because of this use. Alcoholism is a disability under the ADA;
therefore, a person with alcoholism is an individual with a disability.
Consequently, that individual may not be discriminated against on
the basis of the alcoholism, and the individual may be entitled to
a reasonable accommodation if the individual is qualified to perform
the essential functions of the job. The employer may, however,
discipline, discharge, or deny employment to a person who is an
alcoholic and whose use of alcohol adversely affects his job
performance or conduct to the extent that the person is no longer
"qualified."66
The ADA excludes from protection homosexuals, bisexuals,
transsexuals, transvestites, other individuals with conditions related
to sexual behavior, compulsive gamblers, kleptomaniacs, pyromaniacs,
and individuals with mental disorders resulting from illegal drug
use.67
E. Reasonable Accommodations
An employer is required to make "reasonable accommodations"
for the known disabilities of otherwise qualified individuals. 68 While
this requirement imposes significant burdens on employers, the ADA
allows employers to assert a defense to this obligation. The employer
may demonstrate that the required accommodation will cause "undue
hardship" on him. 69 The reasonableness of the accommodations
depends, in part, on the employer's ability to pay for the installment
and implementation of those accommodations.7"
The obligation to provide reasonable accommodations applies
in two settings: 1) reasonable accommodations in facilities and 2)
reasonable accommodations in the operations of the business. 71
65. TAM, supra note 57, at VIII-3; ADA § 104(b)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)(1)-
(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
66. TAM, supra note 57, Drug and Alcohol Abuse, at VIII-3.
67. ADA § 511 (a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 1992). For a discussion
of these exclusions, see 3A LARSON & LARSON, supra note 29, § 108A.32.
68. ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
69. Id.
70. Shannon, supra note 12, at 55.
71. ADA § 101(9)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
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Reasonable accommodations in facilities means removal of barriers
in order to make those facilities easily accessible to individuals with
disabilities. 72 This provision refers to architectural or structural
changes, and it covers both the employee's immediate work area
and public areas such as lunch rooms, restrooms, and conference
rooms. 73 Depending upon the nature of the accommodations, large
businesses may be expected to make them in situations in which
small businesses would not be expected to make them due to the
financial burden the changes create.
Reasonable accommodations in operations of the business include:
[Jiob restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment [of an otherwise qualified employee] to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, or
appropriate ... modifications of examinations, training materials,
or policies . . . and other similar accommodations for individuals
with disabilities. 74
Three general classes of reasonable accommodations are required
throughout the evolution of an employer/employee relationship. In
the job application process, reasonable accommodations are
modifications or adjustments that enable a qualified applicant with
a disability to be considered for the position that is currently available. 75
In the workplace or in an individual's performance of his job,
reasonable accommodations are modifications or adjustments that
enable the qualified individual with a disability to perform the
essential functions of that position. 76  Finally, reasonable
accommodations also include modifications or adjustments that allow
an employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges
72. ADA § 101(9)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(2)(i) (1993).
73. Parry, supra note 11, at 25.
74. ADA § 101(9)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (1993).
75. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(i) (1993). For example, an employer
allowing a job applicant with dyslexia to take an oral examination, if a written
test is not essential to the job application process, would constitute a reasonable
accommodation. See Parry, supra note 11, at 26 (citing Stutts v. Freeman, 694
F.2d 666 (lth Cir. 1983) (case decided under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973)).
76. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii) (1993). Some examples are modifying or ad-
justing when and how the essential functions of the job are performed, reassigning
nonessential functions of the job, modifying a disabled individual's work schedule
to allow him to receive treatment during regular work hours, or allowing a full-
time employee to return to work part-time while the individual recovers from an
injury. See Parry, supra note 11, at 26.
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of employment as those enjoyed by similarly situated employees
77without disabilities.
F. Undue Hardship
An accommodation will not be required if it imposes an "undue
hardship" on the employer. 78 "Undue hardship" is "an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense" when considered in light
of several factors such as the employer's financial resources or the
number of employees. 79
The legislative history of the ADA indicates that the regulations
promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act were almost fully
incorporated into the ADA, and the case law that developed under
the Rehabilitation Act thus provides guidance for cases arising under
the ADA.80 Therefore, to determine more specifically what constitutes
"reasonable accommodations" and "undue hardship," the regulations
implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
case law interpreting those regulations should be consulted.
III. HIRING AND EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES UNDER TITLE I
OF THE ADA
Since the enactment of Title I of the ADA, significant changes
have occurred in employer hiring practices.' The ADA seeks to
preclude employers from using selection criteria, methods of testing,
results of medical examinations, or answers to medical questions to
justify hiring and employment practices that may discriminate against
individuals with disabilities. The ADA has substantially curtailed
discriminatory practices followed before the ADA became effective.
The restrictions imposed in the hiring process are necessary to ensure
that qualified applicants and employees are not screened out or
dismissed, due to their disability, before their actual ability to perform
77. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii) (1993). The regulation specifically uses the term
"equal" instead of "the same" to emphasize that although individuals with dis-
abilities must have equal access to benefits and privileges, this does not mean that
they will enjoy "the same" results from those benefits and privileges or be given
"the same" benefits and privileges. See Parry, supra note 11, at 25 (citing 56 Fed.
Reg. 35,729 (1991)).
78. ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
79. See ADA § 101(10)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1992);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(1)-(2) (1993). For an explanation of the factors considered
in determining whether an accommodation is an "undue hardship," see Parry,
supra note 11, at 27; 3A LARSON & LARSON, supra note 29, § 108A.42(b).
80. Jules L. Smith, An Employer Compliance Checklist: The Employment Pro-
visions of the ADA, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 81 (Jan. 1992).
81. See generally ADA § 102(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
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a job is evaluated. Therefore, the ADA contains specific provisions
concerning the use of qualification standards, methods of testing,
and other selection criteria. The ADA also contains specific provisions
concerning the use of medical examinations and medical inquiries
in the hiring process and in employment settings.
A. Qualification Standards
Employers must not use qualification standards, employment
tests, or other criteria that screen out or tend to screen out individuals
with disabilities on the basis of their disabilities.8 2 This ADA provision
ensures that there is correlation between the job criteria and the
applicant or employee's actual ability to do the job. Therefore, it
is unlawful to use job criteria that, even unintentionally, screen out,
or tend to screen out, individuals with disabilities because of their
disabilities, unless the criteria are job-related and consistent with
business necessity.83 This provision applies to all types of selection
criteria, including safety, vision, hearing, walking, or lifting
requirements, as well as employment tests.84
B. Administration of Tests
Employers must select and administer employment tests in the
most effective manner to ensure that, when the test is administered
to an applicant or employee with a disability which impairs his
sensory, manual, or speaking skills, the test results accurately reflect
the individual's skills, aptitude, or any other qualifications that the
test purports to measure.85 Naturally, when sensory, manual, or
speaking skills are the factors that the test seeks to measure, this
provision is inapplicable." This provision emphasizes the unlawfulness
of excluding individuals with disabilities from jobs that they can
82. ADA § 102(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.10 (1993).
83. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993) for EEOC Interpretive Guidance. The
Interpretative Guidance contains an explanation of this provision and its relation
to "essential functions" and production standards. The concept of "business ne-
cessity" has the same meaning it has under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. Thus, selection criteria that exclude, or tend to exclude, individuals with
disabilities because of their disabilities and do not relate to an essential function
of the job would be inconsistent with business necessity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10
(1993).
84. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 (1993).
85. ADA § 102 (b)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.11 (1993).
86. Id.
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actually perform merely because their disabilities prevent them from
taking an employment test or negatively influences the results of
the employment test. Thus, the provision requires that when
employment tests are taken by individuals with impaired sensory,
manual, or speaking skills, the tests must be administered in formats
that do not necessitate the use of the impaired skill. 87
The employer's obligation to comply with this provision arises
at the time he becomes aware that the applicant or employee will
require special modifications. Thus, when neither the individual with
the disability nor the employer knows before the testing is to take
place that the individual will need to take an alternative test or
otherwise have reasonable accommodations, the employer's obligation
arises when the individual realizes that, due to his disability, he will
need to take a modified test and advises the employer of such need.88
However, this provision does not require employers to offer applicants
or employees their choice of test formats. This provision only requires
employers to provide alternative, accessible tests to individuals whose
disabilities impair the sensory, manual, or speaking skills needed to
take the test, unless, of course, the tests are intended to measure
precisely those skills. For example, in the case of an applicant with
dyslexia, the employer may legally require the applicant to take a
written test if: 1) the ability to read is a skill the test is designed
to measure; 2) an essential function of that particular job is the
ability to read; or 3) no reasonable accommodations are available
to enable the individual to perform that essential function, or the
necessary accommodations would not be reasonable because they
would impose an undue hardship on the employer.89
87- See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993) for EEOC Interpretive Guidance. The
Interpretive Guidance contains an explanation of the application of this provision.
Examples of a reasonable accommodation in this regard would be administering
an oral test to an individual with dyslexia, instead of requiring him to take a
written employment test. Conversely, if the applicant or employee suffers from a
disability that impairs his speaking skills or processing of auditory information, a
written test must be given to him instead of an oral employment test. See 29
C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993). With regard to alternative test modes or formats, it is
suggested that employers might utilize large print or braille on tests or that the
tests could be administered through a reader or sign interpreter. If it is not possible
to administer tests in any of these alternative formats as a reasonable accommo-
dation, the employer may be required to evaluate the skill to be tested through
an interview or through evaluation of the applicant's education, license, or work
experience. Id.
88. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993) for examples of the application of this
provision.
89. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993).
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C. Medical Examinations and Inquiries
Title I of the ADA severely limits the employer's ability to
subject job applicants to medical examinations and ask medical
questions during the initial application process. 90 These limitations
force employers to modify traditional methods used to evaluate the
physical or mental ability of applicants, such as preemployment
physicals, diagnostic tests, and strength tests. The goal of these
limitations is to discourage employers from using those traditional
methods to discriminate against individuals with disabilities.
Specifically, by prohibiting medical examinations and inquiries in
the preemployment stage, Congress sought to preclude an employer
from refusing to hire an otl~erwise qualified applicant deemed to be
a high risk based on the results of medical examinations, answers
to medical inquiries, and the employer's assessment (objective and
subjective). Employers must consider whether an applicant is
reasonably well suited for the position before they can request the
applicant to undergo medical examinations or answer medical
questions. Therefore, employers must review their hiring practices,
including a review of all application processes and questionnaires.
Title I establishes a two-step job application process. The first
step occurs when the individual applies and interviews for a job.
The second step occurs after the employer makes a conditional
employment offer to the applicant following the initial interview.
The employment offer is conditioned on the results of medical
examinations and answers to medical questions. In each of these
two steps, Title I specifically establishes when and how medical
examinations and inquiries can become part of the hiring process.
1. Medical Examinations and Inquiries Before a Conditional
Offer of Employment
Title I of the ADA prohibits employers from asking an applicant
to submit to medical examinations, inquiring about whether the
applicant has a disability, or inquiring about the nature or severity
of a disability. 9' This prohibition applies to any type of inquiry,
whether in an application form, personal or telephone interview, or
any other selection process. Similarly, employers cannot inquire about
the applicant's workers' compensation history. Employers can,
however, ask questions relating to the applicant's ability to perform
essential and marginal job-related functions, so long as the queries
are not worded in terms of a disability. 92 If the applicant's disability
90. ADA § 102(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.13(a).
91. Id.
92. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(a) (1993). For example, the employer may ask whether
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prevents him from performing an essential job-related function and
it is not possible to provide a reasonable accommodation that would
allow the applicant to perform that essential function, the employer
may refuse to hire the applicant. On the other hand, if the applicant's
disability prevents him from performing only a marginal job-related
function, the employer may not refuse to hire the applicant. 9
Employers may also ask an applicant to demonstrate, with or
without reasonable accommodations, how he would perform job-
related functions. 94 If the applicant's obvious or known disability
may interfere with or prevent his ability to perform a job function,
an employer may ask the applicant to demonstrate or describe how
he would perform the job-function, whether or not the employer
routinely makes similar requests to otfier job applicants. On the
other hand, if the applicant's obvious or known disability will not
interfere with or prevent him from performing a job-related function,
the employer may ask the applicant to demonstrate or describe how
he would perform the job function only if the employer routinely
asks all applicants in the same job category to demonstrate or describe
how they would perform the job function. 95
Physical agility tests are not considered medical examinations,
and, thus, they may be given at any stage in the application or
employment process. Those tests, however, must be given to all
similarly situated applicants or employees whether or not they have
the applicant has a driver's license, if driving is a job function, but may not ask
whether the applicant has a visual disability or impairment. Id.
A class action lawsuit was filed in an Alabama federal district court in 1993
against Morrison, Inc., alleging that the employer asked applicants questions that
are prohibited by the ADA. The job application form utilized by Morrison, Inc.,
asked whether the applicant was an individual with a disability and also inquired
into the nature and severity of the disability. The complaint alleged that these
questions, during the preemployment stage, were impermissible under the ADA.
ADA Lawsuit Alleges Illegal Preemployment Inquiries, Accommodating Disabilities
(CCH) No. 18, at 2 (May 1993) (citing Johnston v. Morrison, Inc., No. CV-93-
N-0517-M (D.C. Ala. filed Mar. 17, 1993)).
93. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (1993). Questions must be carefully
asked. Employers may not ask whether the applicant has a disability that prevents
him from performing job-related functions. This type of question, essentially, would
be asking whether the applicant had a disability, and Title I prohibits these questions.
Instead, employers must first determine the types of essential job-functions and
then ask the applicant whether he can perform those functions. Chai Feldblum,
Medical Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A
View from the Inside, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 521, 537 n.98 (1991). This excellent
article discusses the legislative history of the ADA, and, specifically, the process
that culminated with the passage of the provisions concerning medical examinations
and inquiries.
94. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (1993).
95. ADA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a)
(1993).
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a disability. If it is determined that the tests screen out or tend to
screen out individuals with disabilities, the employer must establish
that the test is job-related, consistent with business necessity, and
that satisfactory performance cannot be achieved with reasonable
accommodations."
2. Medical Examinations and Inquiries After a Conditional
Offer of Employment
Under Title I, employers can require postoffer medical
examinations and answers to medical questions before the employee
actually starts working, provided that all entering employees in the
same job category are subjected to the same examinations and
questions whether or not they have a disability. Employers may
condition their offers of employment on the results of the medical
examinations and answers to the medical questions. 97 However,
employers cannot withdraw conditional offers of employment based
on the results of medical examinations or answers to medical inquiries,
unless the results or answers suggest that the applicant is not qualified
to perform the essential job functions. Legislative history indicates
that Congress wanted to prevent the use of medical examinations
and medical inquiries to discriminate against an individual with a
disability if he is qualified for the job notwithstanding his disability. 98
Although the medical examinations permitted under this provision
do not have to be job-related and consistent with the business
necessity, employers may not use the results to withdraw offers of
employment to otherwise qualified applicants. Specifically, if the
employer withdraws an offer of employment because the medical
examination reveals that the employee does not satisfy certain
employment criteria, the exclusionary criteria, at that point, must
96. Id. It is unclear whether this provision permitting agility tests also permits
an employer to ask an applicant to lift 100-pound sacks of flour, which would
be a strength test. See generally Matthew B. Schiff & David L. Miller, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: A New Challenge for Employers, 27 TORT AND IN s. L.J. 44
(1991).
For suggestions on how to conduct preemployment job interviews consistent
with the requirements of the ADA, see Checklist Forms Strategy for Job Interviews,
Accommodating Disabilities (CCH), at 1 (May 1992); Interviewing Applicants with
Disabilities: Script for a Training Session, Accommodating Disabilities (CCH), at
6-7 (March 1992); Job Interviews: What Will Employers be Able to Ask After
July 26?, Accommodating Disabilities (CCH), at 6-7 (June 1992). See also Philip
L. Gordon, Job Application Process After the Americans with Disabilities Act,
18-2 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 185 (1992-93).
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1993).
98. Feldblum, supra note 93, at 537 n.100.
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be job-related and consistent with business necessity. To justify the
exclusionary criteria as job-related and consistent with business
necessity, the employer must show that no reasonable accommodations
will enable the applicant to perform the essential functions of the
job.99
The results of medical examinations and the answers to medical
questions must be kept confidential during the hiring stage and may
be used only as specified in the ADA. The information collected
must be maintained on separate forms, be arranged in separate
medical files, and be treated as a confidential medical record.' °° This
information may be disclosed only to three persons: 1) a supervisor
or manager may be informed regarding necessary restrictions on the
work or duties of the employee and necessary accommodations; 2)
first aid and safety personnel may be informed if the disability might
require emergency treatment; and 3) a government official investigating
compliance of this provision may be provided any relevant information
upon request.'0 ' Under the ADA, an applicant may bring a cause
of action against the employer for breach of confidentiality of medical
records obtained by the employer during the job application stage. 102
3. Medical Examinations or Medical Inquiries of Employees
With the exception of voluntary medical examinations and
voluntary medical histories, administered as part of a health program
available to employees, employers cannot require an employee to
submit to a medical examination, answer medical questions, or answer
99. ADA § 102(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.14(b) (1993).
100. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(1) (1993).
'Al , r-%A JZ 121 11 9 2 U-S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B1)(i-iii) (Supp. IV 1992).
This requirement of confidentiality creates a potential problem for employers, since
providing reasonable accommodations without being able to explain the reasons
for these accommodations may result in creating an appearance of discrimination
to other workers in the same job category who are not given the accommodations
that the individual with a disability gets (e.g., flexible hours or relief from lifting).
See James G. Frierson, An Employer's Dilemma: The ADA 's Provisions on Rea-
sonable Accommodation and Confidentiality, 43 LAB. L.J. 308 (1992).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1992). Due to the potential exposure
to liability and the limited authorized use of medical examination results and answers
to medical questions, it has been argued that employers will be uncertain as to
how much they can or should ask. Therefore, they will probably opt for rather
narrowly defined medical examinations and inquiries. Employers will possibly focus
on gathering information that is either directly relevant to the applicant's ability
to perform the essential functions of the job or information necessary to obtain
some basic information for future possible workers' compensation claims. See
Feldblum, supra note 93, at 538.
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questions regarding the existence, nature, or severity of an employee's
disability.103 This provision seeks to prevent employers from subjecting
disabled employees to medical tests or inquiries that do not serve
a legitimate business purpose. °4 An employer may, however, make
inquiries to determine the ability of an employee to perform job-
related functions. 5 The results of any medical examinations or
medical histories of on-the-job employees must also be kept
confidential.
IV. EFFECT OF TITLE I OF THE ADA ON EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS IN THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION CONTEXT
Although the ADA does not preempt state workers' compen-
sation laws, except to the extent that they are inconsistent with it,
the relationship between the ADA and state workers' compensation
law presents difficult issues. For example, employers have tradi-
tionally evaluated the physical and mental condition and ability of
applicants by preemployment questions and physicals. Based upon
the results of these screening techniques, the employer could simply
choose not to hire an applicant when he thought that the applicant
was a high risk. This practice is now illegal under the ADA. Thus,
the most significant impacts of the ADA in the workers' compen-
sation context are most likely the prohibition on screening applicants
through preemployment medical examinations or questions, the res-
trictions on the use of medical examinations generally, and the limited
authorized use and dissemination of the results of such examinations.
Another major impact of the ADA on workers' compensation is
the requirement that employers retain workers injured on the job,
even when the worker may no longer be able to perform all the
duties of that job. In this connection, one of the principal concerns
to employers is the ADA's requirement that the employer make
reasonable accommodations so that any qualified individual with a
103. ADA § 102(c)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.13(b) (1993).
104. The example given in the EEOC regulations is a situation in which the
employer notices increased absenteeism and signs of sickness in an employee; the
employer cannot require the employee to be tested for AIDS, HIV, or cancer unless
the employer can justify such action as job-related and consistent with business
necessity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) (1993). It is difficult to argue, however, that an
employee's frequent absences and likely low productivity because of an illness is
of no concern to the employer. It appears to be an issue covered under the umbrella
of legitimate "job-relatedness and business necessity."
105. ADA § 102(c)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.14(d) (1993).
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disability can perform the essential functions of a job. 0 6 Finally,
the ADA also affects the exclusivity clauses in workers' compensation
statutes.
A. Preemployment Inquiries
1. Limitations on Determining the Physical and Mental
Condition of Applicants
The principal focus of the ADA's protection of individuals with
disabilities is the prohibition against any question by an employer
to an applicant concerning either the existence of a disability, the
nature of a disability or phrased in terms of a disability. 07 This
means that an employer may not ask any preemployment question,
in a written application or orally, concerning any physical or mental
condition, any prior injuries, or prior workers' compensation claims
before making a conditional offer of employment. 08 An employer
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
107. ADA § 102(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.13(b) (1993).
108. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(a) (1993). Some questions related to the applicant's
use of drugs and alcohol can possibly be asked during the pre-offer stage, but
they have to be carefully worded. For example, an employer can ask if an applicant
drinks alcohol, but the employer cannot ask if the applicant is an alcoholic. The
employer can ask if the applicant is using drugs illegally at the time of the interview,
but the employer cannot ask if the applicant has ever used drugs illegally. Finally,
an employer can ask how many days the applicant missed work the previous year,
but he cannot ask how many days the applicant missed due to problems related
to substance abuse. Interviews-Preoffer Drug and Alcohol Inquiries You Can Ask,
Accommodating Disabilities (CCH), at 2 (May 1993) (citing remarks made by Mark
Graves, labor and employment attorney with Alley and Alley, Tampa, Florida, in
The Changing Tide: Navigating Through Employment Laws under the New Ad-
minstration, a seminar sponsored by Alley and Alley, April 30, 1993).
These examples reflect the protection given by the ADA to those who abuse
illegal drugs and alcohol. A person who currently uses illegal drugs is not protected
by the ADA. However, former drug addicts who have been successfully rehabilitated
are protected by the ADA. ADA § 102(a)-(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a)-(b) (Supp. IV
1992). Alcoholism is a "disability" under the ADA. Therefore, persons who are
alcoholics may not be discriminated against if they are satisfactorily performing
their jobs. TAM, supra note 57, Drug and Alcohol Abuse, at VIII-3.
The ADA's protection of alcoholics and former drug users is important under
the new Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act, which significantly changed the
definition of "compensable injury." Under the new act, compensable injuries do
not include injuries substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs,
or prescription drugs used in contravention of physician's orders. ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 1l-9-105(5)(B)(iv) (Michie Supp. 1993). Moreover, if an alcoholic is injured on
the job, the law creates a rebuttable presumption that the injury was caused by
the use of alcohol, and, therefore, his injury is not compensable. However, because
under the ADA alcoholism is a disability, if the employer refuses to provide
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may not base his decision to bypass the applicant simply on speculation
that the applicant may cause increased workers' compensation costs
in the future. An employer can, however, discharge or refuse to
hire an individual who is incapable of performing a job without
posing a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety
of the individual or others if that risk cannot be eliminated or
reduced by reasonable accommodations. 0 9
During this initial stage of the hiring process, an employer may
ask questions about the applicant's ability to perform job-related
functions with or without reasonable accommodations.1 0 An employer
may also ask an applicant to describe or demonstrate how, with or
without reasonable accommodation, he will perform job-related
functions."' For example, an employer may ask an applicant with
only one arm to describe how he will perform the duties of the
mail clerk position he is seeking. If the applicant requires some
accommodation to perform the job-related duties, the employer must
either provide the accommodation the applicant needs or permit the
applicant to explain how he will perform the duties.
During this pre-offer stage an employer may also lawfully require
the applicant to submit to drug tests, because testing for illegal
drugs is not considererd to be a "medical examination" under the
ADA. The ADA does not prohibit, encourage, or authorize an
employer to conduct drug tests of job applicants or employees to
determine the illegal use of drugs or to make employment decisions
based on such test results." ' 2 This provision is particularly important
in the workers' compensation context because employers generally
use preemployment drug testing as a means to control costs of
workers' compensation benefits,"' because studies show that employees
with a problem of drug abuse have more accidents. Therefore, testing
can be an effective tool to screen out high risk employees." 4
compensation for the alcoholic employee's injury, the injured worker may very
likely be in a position to bring a charge of discrimination on the basis of his
disability. This scenario would present a situation in which the state workers'
compensation law is inconsistent with the ADA and is, therefore, probably preempted
by the ADA.
109. TAM, supra note 57, Workers' Compensation and Work-Related Injuries,
at IX-l [hereinafter Workers' Compensation].
110. ADA § 102(c)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.'§ 12112(c)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.4 (1993).
111. ADA § 102(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.14(a) (1993).
112. ADA § 104(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 12114(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.16(c) (1993).
113. Schiff & Miller, supra note 96, at 63.
114. Schiff & Miller, supra note 96, at 63 (citing Zwerling et al., The Efficacy
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After making a conditional employment offer, an employer may
ask the applicant about his workers' compensation history, ask him
to undergo a medical examination, or request the applicant to answer
medical questions as long as that is also required of all applicants
in the same job category." 5 However, an employer may not require
an applicant to have a medical examination because a response to
a medical question (as opposed to results from a medical examination)
discloses a previous injury sustained on the job, unless all applicants
in the same job category are required to have the examination." 6
An employer may also ask an applicant questions, or may use the
medical examination, to determine the need for reasonable
accommodations." 7 Any information obtained through these
preplacement medical examinations and questions must be kept
separately from the personnel file and treated as confidential medical
records." 8 Employers cannot use this information to discriminate
against individuals with disabilities." 9 Finally, an employer may,
without violating the ADA's confidentiality requirement and in
accordance with state workers' compensation laws, submit to state
workers' compensation offices and "second injury funds" the medical
information and records concerning applicants and employees that
were obtained after a conditional employment offer. 20
The ADA also permits an employer to inform supervisors of
necessary restrictions on work or duties and necessary
accommodations. If the disability may require emergency treatment,
the employer may additionally notify first aid and safety personnel.
Government officials investigating Xcompliance with the ADA may
of Pre-employment Drug Screening for Marijuana and Cocaine in Predicting Em-
ployment Outcome, 264 JAMA 20 (1990)).
This provision of the ADA is consistent with the Arkansas Workers' Compensation
Act, which states that employees are deemed by their performance of services to
have impliedly consented to reasonable and responsible testing for illegal drugs.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 1 1-9-102(5)(B)(iv) (Michie Supp. 1993).
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1993); TAM, supra note 57, at IX-3.
116. TAM, supra note 57, at IX-3.
117. ADA § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c)
(1993).
118. ADA § 102(d)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.14(b)(1) (1993).
119. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1993). It has been suggested that it would not be
inconsistent with the ADA to use these tests in defending workers' compensation
cases. Specifically, it is argued that employers could use baseline audiometric tests
to rebut claims of work-induced hearing loss, or findings that the applicant is
restricted from raising his leg to rebut a later claim of back injury. Schiff & Miller,
supra note 96, at 61.
120. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) (1993).
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also be informed.1 21 Employers may also use information from medical
inquiries and examinations to verify employment history; to screen
out applicants with a history of fraudulent workers' compensation
claims; and to screen out individuals who would pose a "direct
threat" to the health or safety of themselves or others, that could
not be reduced to an acceptable level or eliminated by a reasonable
accommodation. 122
2. Limitations on Gathering Information Required to
Establish the Possible Existence of a "Second Injury
Fund" Case
Like the ADA, the concept of a Second Injury Fund (SIF)
statute seeks to promote the employment of individuals with
disabilities. It does so by providing reimbursement for those workers'
compensation claims that are either caused or exacerbated by a
preexisting condition.1 2 1 Where an employee's preexisting condition
combines with a recent workplace injury to create more disability
than would have resulted from the injury on the job done, the SIF
pays benefits. SIF payments benefit both the employer and the
worker. In an SIF case, the employer pays only for the additional
disability resulting from the injury sustained by the worker at his
workplace-the compensable injury. The injured worker is fully
compensated because he receives benefit payments based on all the
disability resulting from the preexisting condition combined with the
compensable injury. The goal of this system of compensation is to
ease employers' anxiety about hiring individuals with disabilities who
might represent increased exposure to liability for workers'
compensation benefits. 24
The ADA affects SIF statutes because of its restrictions on
preemployment examinations and interviews. In effect, the ADA bars
all questions about the existence, nature, and severity of past or
present disabilities, medical conditions or history, workers'
compensation history, or any preexisting, injury. This prohibition
directly clashes with the SIF statutes of many states, which protect
121. 29 C.F.R. § 1630(b)(1)(i)-(iii) (1993). Employers should be aware that the
risk of tort actions brought against them for defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, or invasion of privacy is substantial when sensitive medical
information is disseminated. Schiff & Miller, supra note 96, at 62.
122. TAM, supra note 57, at IX-3 to -4.
123. H. Michael Bagley et al., Workers' Compensation, 44 MERCER L. REV.
457, 509 (1992).
124. ZAN DAVIS & WILLIAM M. GRIFFIN, III, WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN AR-
KANSAS: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 59-60 (1991).
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employers only if they know about the employee's preexisting
impairments. Arkansas is one such state. 125 Thus, the ADA's
prohibition against preemployment inquiries concerning any physical
or mental impairment significantly changes the manner in which an
employer may prove the elements of employer knowledge that are
essential to preserve a SIF case. If, as they have always done at
the pre-offer stage, employers ask questions necessary to discover
the facts that the SIF statute requires them to have, they will be
violating Title I of the ADA. However, some provisions of Title I
may allow employers to discover some of the required information.
One such provision allows employers to make preemployment
inquiries into the ability of the applicant to perform job-related
functions. 2 6 For example, although an employer could not ask the
applicant directly whether he had a weak back, he could ask an
applicant for a position as a construction worker whether he could
operate heavy construction equipment and climb scaffolding. 27
The other provision that aids employers in discovering information
about the applicant's medical history and possible disabilities allows
the employer, after making a conditional employment offer, to
require the applicant to undergo a medical examination, 28 provided
that all prospective employees undergo a medical examination.1 29
125. ARK . CODE ANN. § 11-9-525 (Michie 1987) reads as follows in pertinent
part:
(a)(1) The Second Injury Trust Fund established in this chapter is a
special fund designed to insure that an employer employing a handicapped
worker will not, in the event the worker suffers an injury on the job, be
held liable for a greater disability or impairment than actually occurred
while the worker was in his employment.
(2) The employee is to be fully protected in that the Second Injury
Fund pays the worker the difference between the employer's liability and
the balance of his disability or impairment which resdts from all disabilities
or impairments combined.
(3) It is intended that latent conditions which are not known to the
employee or employer not be considered previous disabilities or impairments
which would give rise to a claim against the Second Injury Fund.
(emphasis added).
126. ADA § 102(d)(2)(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.14(a) (1993).
127. 2 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 59.33(g), at
10-525 (1992) (citing 136 CONG. REC. H2632 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (remarks of
Rep. Owens)).
128. ADA § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.14(b) (1993).
129. It has been suggested that the impact of the ADA on potential SIF claims
is not as dramatic as it seems because such claims have never been dependent upon
the employer's knowledge of the preexisting condition at the preoffer stage. Although
employers have generally determined the existence of a preexisting condition in the
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In promulgating its Final Rules, the EEOC recognized the concern
of employers about whether they would be able to obtain medical
information from applicants without violating the ADA, and, as a
consequence, it issued regulations allowing inquiries as well as medical
examinations. 30 The regulations provide that the medical examinations
need not be job-related or consistent with business necessity, unless
the employer intends to use the information gained through those
examinations and inquiries to screen out applicants or employees
with disabilities.' Finally, the regulations explain that the statutory
language requiring that the medical examinations be given to "all
employees" means "all employees in the same job category.' ' 32
The EEOC has stated that the information obtained from a
lawful entrance examination or inquiry is to be treated as a confidential
medical record and may be used only in accordance with the
regulations. This confidentiality requirement, however, does not mean
that state workers' compensation laws are preempted by the ADA.
Specifically, the EEOC has stated that employers may submit the
information obtained through medical examinations or inquiries to
the state workers' compensation offices or SIFs in accordance with
state workers' compensation laws. 33
Although the regulations seem to resolve the conflict between
the requirement of the SIF to get information from the applicant
and the ADA's prohibition on asking any questions concerning the
applicant's past medical history, Professor Arthur Larson, the leading
authority on workers' compensation law, questioned the extent to
which the federal regulations actually control. 134 He anticipated that
two questions may arise: (1) whether courts will consider the EEOC
to be the final arbiter on the interpretation of the statute, and (2)
whether the EEOC's statement that the ADA does not preempt
workers' compensation laws means that the employer, consistent with
the ADA, can obtain information necessary for the SIF through
other means if the medical examination does not reveal it.135
preoffer stage, that is simply because the employer has obtained such information
from medical inquiries and employment applications. Bagley, supra note 123, at
471. It has further been suggested that complying with the requirements of the
ADA will actually make it easier for employers to prove knowledge of SIF cases,
because the medical examinations and questions will be more specifically directed
at potential SIF claims. Bagley, supra note 123, at 471.
130. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1993).
131. Id. § 1630.14(b)(3).
132. Id. § 1630.14(b).
133. 2 LARSON, supra note 127, at 10-527 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, Interpretive
Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, § 1630.14(b)).
134. See 2 LARSON, supra note 127, at 10-527.
135. See 2 LARSON, supra note 127, at 10-527.
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The first question reflects concerns by employers that courts
might find the EEOC's regulations inconsistent with the plain language
of the statute. It is unknown whether courts will interpret "all
entering employees" literally, or, in accord with the regulations, as
"all entering employees in the same job category." It is equally
unclear whether courts will interpret the regulatory provision allowing
medical examinations once the employer has extended a conditional
employment offer to include medical inquiries as well.
The second question posed by Professor Larson turns on an
interpretation of the regulations. Although the regulations are clear
that the SIF provisions of state workers' compensation law are not
preempted by the ADA, they do not resolve the issue of whether
the employer is permitted to go beyond the medical examination in
seeking information relevant to the SIF. 136
While these concerns about courts' possible interpretation of
the statutory language may be valid, the EEOC regulations are the
best guidance presently available. They state that once the employer
has extended a conditional offer of employment to the applicant,
it can make inquiries to obtain the information required in connection
for a SIF case.37 The regulations do not provide for any limitation
on the scope of sources from which the required information may
be obtained. Therefore, it is probably reasonable to assume that the
employer may go beyond the medical examination to obtain the
necessary information.
3. Limitations on Gathering Information to Preserve a
"Misrepresentation" Defense
In addition to affecting how employers may assess whether an
applicant will represent a potentially high risk, the ADA's restrictions
on the questions that can be asked during the preemployment stage
raise issues concerning a misrepresentation defense to a workers'
compensation claim-generally termed in Arkansas the "Shippers
Defense." In Shippers Transport of Georgia v. Stepp, 38 the Arkansas
Supreme Court established a defense to workers' compensation claims.
Under this defense, a false representation as to physical condition
in procuring employment can preclude workers' compensation benefits
for an otherwise compensable injury. To prevail on the defense, the
employer must show that: (1) the employee knowingly and willfully
made false representations as to his physical condition; (2) the
employer relied on that false representation and that reliance was
136. See 2 LARSON, supra note 127, at 10-527.
137. See TAM, supra note 57, at IX-6.
138. 265 Ark. 365, 578 S.W.2d 232 (1979); See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-
106 (Michie 1987).
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a substantial factor in the employment; and (3) there was a causal
connection between the false representation and the injury.1 a9 This
defense is designed to preclude claims that result from fraud in the
hiring process.14°
Before the enactment of the ADA, an employer could preserve
this defense by asking job applicants questions about their medical
history either during the job interview or on the job application
form. If an employer did not elicit this information, the defense
would be lost because the employee would have made no
misrepresentation.
Because the ADA now prohibits specific questions in employment
applications regarding past conditions, many employers fear that the
Shippers defense is dead. This fear is probably unfounded. The
Technical Assistance Manual issued by the EEOC specifically states
that the ADA does not prevent the use of the misrepresentation
defense to a workers' compensation claim,' 4' but an employer must
wait to ask the necessary questions until after it has made a conditional
employment offer. If the misrepresentation defense requires that the
applicant misrepresent his condition to the employer during the hiring
process before he starts to work, the employer can still raise the
defense when the applicant makes false representations after the
employer has made a conditional employment offer. Analysis of the
facts in Shippers supports this argument.
The employer's defense in Shippers was based on the employee's
false representation on his written employment application that he
had not previously been injured on a job. "In fact, he had suffered
three prior injuries, . . . resulting in a collective forty percent
permanent partial disability rating to the body as a whole.' ' 42 The
rationale of the Arkansas Supreme Court in reaching its decision
was that public policy required imposing an obligation on the employee
to answer truthfully any questions the employer may ask about
preemployment health conditions. The court was influenced by the
principle in workers' compensation law that requires the employer
to take an employee as it finds him, with all the risks associated
with hiring an employee who is already disabled. Consequently, the
139. Shippers, 265 Ark. at 369, 578 S.W.2d at 234.
140. Other jurisdictions also recognize this defense. See, e.g., Blanton v. Work-
men's Comp. Bd., 531 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. Ct. App. 1976); Martinez v. Driver
Mechenbier, Inc., 562 P.2d 843 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977); Givens v. Steel Structures,
Inc., 301 S.E.2d 545 (S.C. 1983); Federal Copper and Aluminum Co. v. Dickey,
493 S.W.2d 463 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973). See also 1B A. LARSON, supra note 127
§ 47.53; DAVIs & GRIFFIN, supra note 124, at 37.
141. TAM, supra note 57, at IX-7.
142. Shippers, 265 Ark. at 367, 578 S.W.2d at 232-33.
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court reasoned that it was only fair that the employer have a right
to determine the health history of the employee before employment
to avoid the possible liability for an accidental injury causally related
to a preexisting condition or disability. 43
The court did not require that the questions be asked in the
pre-offer stage. Instead, the court's opinion reflects a public policy
concern to protect employers from fraud. The holding of the court
is based on the principle that fraud at the inception of a contract
makes the contract voidable.
Even if it is assumed that the employee in Shippers had made
false representations about his condition in a post-conditional
employment interview or medical examination rather than in a
preemployment written application, the result should be the same.
In view of the court's rationale, an employer's reliance on information
given by the employee in a post-conditional employment offer interview
or medical examination should have the same effect as if it had
been obtained at the pre-offer stage.
Additionally, it should be noted that the ADA permits the
employer to ask, at the pre-offer stage, whether the applicant can
perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable
accommodation. The employer must, however, word the questions
carefully to avoid violating the ADA and, at the same time, preserve
the misrepresentation defense. A question that seeks detailed
information about disabilities may violate the ADA; moreover, some
authority suggests that the answer to such a question would not
support a misrepresentation defense. 44 On the other hand, a very
general question probably will not preserve the defense. The Arkansas
Court of Appeals has ruled that the question, "Do you have any
physical condition which may limit your ability to perform the job
applied for?" called for an opinion rather than factual information.
Therefore, the court concluded that it was too broad and general
to support the misrepresentaion defense.145
Employers should ask specific, factual questions about specific
essential functions of the job. For example, asking an applicant for
143. Id. at 369, 578 S.W.2d at 234.
144. In Huisenga v. Opus Corp., 494 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. 1993), the Supreme
Court of Minnesota, relying on the Minnesota Human Rights Act, not the ADA,
held that the employer's questions on the job application regarding the physical
and mental condition of the applicant went beyond those essential job-related
functions. Therefore, the employer could not rely on the employee's false answers
to those questions as a defense in subsequent workers' compensation proceedings.
Id. at 474.
145. Sawyer v. Mtarri, 33 Ark. App. 125, 806 S.W.2d 7 (1991).
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a job driving a truck whether he had ever passed out or had a
seizure while driving would probably not be prohibited, but asking
the same question of an applicant for a desk job would probably
be impermissible. The question would be sufficiently precise and
factual so that a false answer would, presumably, allow the employer
to successfully assert the misrepresentation defense if the employee
subsequently had a seizure while driving a truck and sustained an
otherwise compensable injury.
It is unclear what effect the ADA will have on SIF cases and
the misrepresentation defense. Only as courts provide guidance
resulting from litigation will its effects be more certain.
B. Protected Status of Employees Injured on the Job and
Returning Injured Workers
The first step in determining whether Title I applies is to determine
whether the employee has a "disability" as defined by the ADA. 146
This determination is important because an employee may be
"disabled" under workers' compensation law yet still fail to qualify
under the ADA definition. 47 The definition of disability under state
workers' compensation laws differs from that under the ADA because
of the different goal that each act seeks to achieve. Workers'
compensation laws are designed to compensate and to provide needed
assistance to workers who are injured on the job; the ADA is
designed to protect from discrimination against disabled individuals
who are otherwise qualified to work. 48 Generally speaking, medical
problems are not covered by the ADA. Thus, nonchronic,
nonpermanent, easily healing injuries in most circumstances would
not be considered a "disability" under the ADA. However, given
the ADA's broad definition of "disability," it is quite possible that
an employee "disabled" under the workers' compensation statute
would also be an "individual with a disability" under the ADA.
Nonetheless, to be protected, the employee must be "a qualified
146. A "disability" under the ADA means suffering from any physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, having a
record of such impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment. ADA
§ 101(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2) (Supp. IV 1992). For an explanation of the meaning
of each of these definitions, see supra text accompanying notes 45-67.
147. "Disability" for purposes of workers' compensation in Arkansas means
"incapacity because of injury to earn, in the same or any other employment, the
wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." ARK. CODE
ANN. § 11-9-102(5) (Michie 1987).
148. TAM, supra note 57, at IX-2.
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individual with a disability." This means that he must be able to
perform the essential functions of the job with or without
accommodations. 49
Certainly, not every employee injured on the job will be protected
by the ADA, because work-related injuries do not always cause
physical or mental impairments that are severe enough to "substantially
limit" a major life activity such as work. Thus, an employer must
consider work-related injuries on a case-by-case basis to decide whether
an employee is protected by the ADA, because even if an employee
is awarded workers' compensation benefits or is assigned a high
workers' compensation disability rating, that employee is not
automatically protected by the ADA.
The terms "substantially limiting," "record of," and "regarded
as" must, therefore, be understood in the context of workers'
compensation to determine whether an injured worker may be
protected by the ADA. If a worker sustained an injury that normally
heals within a few weeks or months, he would not be considered
to be a person with a disability under the ADA even if he received
workers' compensation benefits for his injury. This is so because
the impairment he suffered from the injury did not "substantially
limit" a major life activity, in view of the fact that the injury healed
within a short period of time and had little or no long-term impact.
On the other hand, if the worker was substantially impaired
during a healing period that was significantly longer than would
normally be expected for the type of injury he sustained, or if the
injury resulted in a permanent limp, he might be protected by the
ADA if his condition substantially limited one or more major life
activities as compared to the average person in the general
population. 50 It should be noted that, for a condition to be a
disability that substantially limits one's ability to work, the condition
must restrict the applicant or employee from "either a class of jobs
or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. The
inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working."''
149. ADA § 1021(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)
(1993).
150. TAM, supra note 57, at IX-2.
151. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1993). This section also lists the factors to be
considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the major
life activity of "working" as follows: (1) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; (3) the permanent or
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Once the individual is deemed to have a "disability" under the
ADA, he cannot, even after full recovery, be subjected to
discrimination based on the record of this past disability. Such
discrimination is barred regardless of whether the employee was
working for the discriminating employer or a prior employer at the
time of the injury and resulting disability.
Finally, if an impairment or condition caused by an injury on
the job does not substantially limit a worker's ability to work, but
the employer regards the individual as having an impairment that
makes him unable to perform a class of jobs, that individual would
be considered to be "regarded" by the employer as having a disability.
Therefore, if the employer discriminated against the employee because
of this perception, the employer would be violating the ADA.12
It should be noted, however, that in each of these hypotheticals
the employer would be liable for discrimination only if the employee
was a "qualified individual with a disability""' and if causation
was established.
C. Employer Obligations Toward Employees Injured on the Job
and Returning Injured Workers
Although one of the underlying purposes of workers'
compensation statutes is to return injured workers to active
employment, 5 4 before the ADA was enacted some employers enjoyed
another option. An employer might have opted instead to pay an
injured worker disability benefits or assist him in finding a job with
long-term impact or the expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting
from the impairment; (4) the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable
access; (5) the job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an
impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge,
skills, or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also
disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or (6) the job from
which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the
number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills,
or abilities within that geographical area, from which the individual is also dis-
qualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes). Id.
§ 1630.20)(2)(i), (ii), (iii), (3)(ii)(A), (B), and (C). Examples demonstrating the
application of each of these factors are provided in the Interpretive Guidance for
each of these sections. See also Lawrence P. Postol and David D. Kadue, An
Employer's Guide to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 LAB. L.J. 323, 324-
25 (1991).
152. TAM, supra note 57, at IX-3.
153. TAM, supra note 57, at IX-3.
154. See, e.g., Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-
9-505 (Michie Supp. 1993), which increases rehabilitation benefits and requires
employers to return injured employees to work or be liable for additional benefits,
including rehabilitation and vocational assistance. See also Philip Pesek, The New
Workers' Compensation Law: What Happens Now?, 27 ARK. LAW. 20, 22-23
(Summer 1993).
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another employer rather than modify the job description so the
employee could come back to work.' After the enactment of the
ADA, however, employers do not have this option because the ADA
requires employers to allow a qualified individual with a disability
to return to work and, if needed, to provide reasonable
accommodations for the employee. Therefore, when an employee is
injured on the job or when an injured employee wishes to return
to work, employers must first determine what the ADA permits as
far as medical examinations and inquiries and what reasonable
accommodations the ADA requires the employer to provide to allow
the injured employee to either continue or return to work.156
1. Medical Examinations and Questions of Current
Employees
The ADA affects the methods employers used before the
enactment of the ADA to determine the physical and mental fitness
of employees seeking a transfer or a promotion and of employees
who are returning to work after an injury sustained on the job."5 7
Title I requires employers to use the same two-step inquiry they are
required to use with applicants.'58 Specifically, the employer may
155. Bagley et al., supra note 123, at 471.
156. The EEOC has indicated that 80% of the ADA charges filed as of August
1993 came from incumbent employees rather than applicants, and that the issue
most frequently alleged was unlawful discharge because of a disability. This in-
formation suggests that employers would be well advised to review their policies
applicable to employees returning to work, particularly the coordination of those
policies with workers' compensation claims. Employers should uniformly enforce
rules concerning authorization to return to work for all employees, whether disabled
or not. If an employee with a disability is involved, employers must be aware of
the additional obligations imposed by the ADA. Return-to-Work Policies May
Require Review, Accommodating Disabilities (CCH) No. 21, at 10 (August 1993).
A recent Florida case exemplifies the potential problem. The issue was whether
it was Walt Disney World's return-to-work policies or the employee's disabilities
that were the reason for her termination. According to her complaint, even though
the employee suffered from two different disabling conditions, she was able to
perform the essential functions of the job well enough that she had won an award
a few months before her termination. Her disabilities, however, did impair her
ability to care for herself and her muscular control when she did not have access
to proper medication. Her supervisors suggested that she take a three-week medical
leave even though she did not have authorization from a doctor, and assured her
that there would be no problem upon her return. When she attempted to return
to work, she was told that Disney's return-to-work policy required her to have a
doctor's release before she could return. Ten days later, she was terminated for
not submitting the medical release. Id. (citing Dauzat v. Walt Disney World Co.,
Fla. No. 93-516-CIV-ORL-19, June 28, 1993).
157. Schiff & Miller, supra note 96, at 45.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103.
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require the employee to submit to medical examinations and answer
medical questions only after the employer believes that the employee
is qualified. 15 9 At that point, the employer could test the employee
for physical and mental fitness to determine whether he is able to
return to work. 160 If the employee is unable to perform the essential
functions of the job, the next question is whether the employee is
159. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103.
160. One authority lists the following as examples of questions that could be
asked:
1. Does the employee's medical condition preclude travel to and from
work? If so, what is the medical reason?
2. Does the employee's medical condition preclude being at work? If
so, what is the medical reason?
3. Has the medical condition adversely affected the employee's life
activities such as driving, shopping, self-care and recreation? If so, how?
4. Does the employee's medical condition preclude assignment of the
tasks and duties of the job? If so, which tasks and duties and what is
the medical reason?
5. Is there a medical reason to believe that the employee is likely to
experience injury, harm or aggravation of the medical condition by per-
forming or attempting to perform the described tasks and duties? If so,
what is the degree of injury, harm or aggravation that should be expected
and what is the likelihood that it will occur?
6. If restrictions on the activity of the employee are warranted because
of a significant risk of harm to the employee or others, what kinds of
measures should be considered in identifying possible accommodations to
eliminate the reason for the restrictions?
7. Is there any reason to believe that the reasonable accommodation
measures described are not medically feasible and appropriate?
8. Is the employee likely to recover sufficiently to have the capacity to
perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable
accommodation? If so, what is the time frame? If not, what is the medical
reason?
Questions to Ask when Making Return-to-Work Determinations, Accommodating
Disabilities (CCH) No. 25, at 9 (December 1993) (citing The Workers' Compensation-
ADA Connection: Supervisory Tools for Workers Compensation Containment that
Reduce ADA Liability). The relevance of the third question, which seems to examine
matters unrelated to the job, is open to debate.
To reduce the costs of workers' compensation, some employers are analyzing
and assessing the merits of a concept known as "flexiplace program." The United
States Department of Defense is one such employer. The goal of the concept is
to get employees off the workers' compensation roll and have them work at home
if they cannot go back into the workplace. Specifically, if the job previously held
by the injured worker required him to spend significant time working in front of
a computer screen, the application of the "flexiplace program" would result in
providing a computer, fax machine, and any adaptive equipment necessary to the
injured worker at home. Commerce Clearing House, Accommodating Disabilities,
January 1994, Cost Containment-Flexiplace Program Reduces Workers' Comp
Costs, at 7.
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disabled. If the employee's condition prevents him from performing
only the duties associated with his old position or only a few
positions, he is not "disabled," and the employer could lawfully
deny the employee the position without any further investigation
into what, if any, reasonable accommodations the employee may
need. On the other hand, if the employee's condition restricts him
from performing "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs
in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills, and abilities,"' 6' he is "disabled" within the meaning
of the ADA, and the employer's obligation to provide reasonable
accommodations applies. 62
If the employee is found to be "disabled," further restrictions
apply concerning the use of medical examinations and questions.
An employer may require an employee to take a medical examination
or to answer medical questions regarding a disability only if the
examination or questions are job-related and consistent with business
necessity. If a worker sustains an injury on the job that appears
to affect his ability to perform the essential functions of the job,
the employer is allowed to require the employee to undergo a job-
related medical examination (not a full physical) and answer job-
related questions. Under these circumstances, the examination and
inquiry will be deemed to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity, and may be required as a condition of returning to work.
A medical examination or inquiry is also allowed to determine what
reasonable accommodations may be required. 63
2. Reasonable Accommodations
It is unlawful under the ADA to discriminate against an employee
with a disability who is otherwise qualified for the job he holds or
seeks. Therefore, the employer cannot refuse to allow an employee
161. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1993).
162. Id.
163. TAM, supra note 57, at IX-4. It has been argued that the requirements of
Title I of the ADA suggest that, to determine whether a worker with a disability
can perform a certain job, the employer must work with a physician who has
experience and training in rehabilitation and ergonomics, because most company
doctors will not have the necessary expertise. It is further argued that for a physician
to be able to make a legally sufficient determination as to whether a worker can
or cannot perform the job, it is essential that the physician know exactly what
the job entails. The physician, therefore, should visit the worksite or view a tape
of someone performing the job so that the doctor will have more facts on which
to base his decision. New Era for "Company Doctors, " Accommodating Disabilities
(CCH) No. 14, at 4 (January 1993).
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with a disability to keep his job or to return to work because the
employee is not fully recovered from his injury, unless: (1) the
employee cannot perform the essential functions of the job he holds
or seeks with or without reasonable accommodation; or (2) allowing
the employee to return to work would pose a significant risk of
substantial harm that could not be reduced to an acceptable level
with reasonable accommodation.'1 To lawfully deny employment on
the latter basis, an employer must be prepared to prove that the
individual's medical condition creates a significant risk of substantial
harm. Decisions to deny employment must be based on a case-by-
case basis and must not represent a policy of excluding all those
who have specific disabilities. The EEOC regulations require that
decisions be made based on the individual's ability to safely perform
the job at the time he is being considered for employment as a
returning injured worker. The regulations also require that
accommodations to reduce or eliminate the risk must be considered
before denying employment to an individual with a disability.1 65
a. Determination of Whether the Employee Can
Perform the Essential Functions of the Job
"Essential functions" means the fundamental job duties of the
job the employee with a disability holds or seeks. The term does
not include marginal functions of the job. As stated earlier, the
EEOC regulations list the following as factors that may make a job
function essential: (1) whether the position exists to perform that
function; (2) whether only a limited number of employees are available
among whom the performance of that function can be distributed;
or (3) whether the function is highly specialized so that the employee
in that position is hired for his expertise or ability to perform that
particular function.' 66 Evidence establishing that the particular function
is essential includes, but is not limited to: (1) the employer's judgment
164. TAM, supra note 57, at IX-4; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1993).
165. James G. Frierson, An Analysis of ADA Provisions on Denying Employment
Because of a Risk of Future Injury, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 603, 603 (1991-92).
The author predicted that the single largest category of charges to be brought
under the ADA is likely to be cases in which individuals with disabilities are denied
employment, or are not allowed to return to work because of a risk of future
injury. This is because employers often believe that employing individuals with
disabilities will increase the chance of accidents on the job and job-related sickness.
Because of this perception, employers fear that hiring individuals with disabilities
will, therefore, mean increased health insurance and workers' compensation prem-
iums, lawsuits, and general disruption in the workforce. Id. Back problems and
injuries constitute the largest category of cases presenting a risk of future occupation
injury and of workers' compensation claims. Id. at 611.
166. ADA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1),(2)(i)-(iii) (1993).
19941
UALR LAW JOURNAL
as to which function is essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared
before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the
amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the
consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function;
(5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) the work
experience of past incumbents in the job; or (7) the current work
experience of incumbents in similar jobs.' 67
The ADA's focus on the ability of an employee with a disability
to perform essential functions of a job with or without
accommodations suggests that employers may be required to eliminate
nonessential functions as a reasonable accommodation to an employee
returning from disability leave. Employers may need to engage the
services of safety and health professionals to assess correctly the
physical and mental abilities of individuals with disabilities in relation
to job requirements. It has been suggested that the proper way to
accomplish the desired goal is to try to fit the job to the worker,
rather than vice versa. This concept is known as "ergonomics."' 61
Preparing job descriptions to comply with the ADA is a good way
to help employers look at jobs from that perspective.16 9 Even if
input from safety and health professionals is not available, employers
will need to determine how disabilities might relate to essential job
functions. 70
167. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(vii).
168. Writing ADA Job Descriptions Can Result in Better Job Design, Accom-
modating Disabilities (CCH) No. 13, at 1 (December 1992) (citing remarks made
by Harold R. Imbus, M.D., of Greensboro, North Carolina, a physician who has
worked with many companies to help them return their injured employees to work).
169. Id. See also Workplaces that Fit Employees, Accommodating Disabilities(CCH) No. 19, at 6 (June 1993) for an explanation of how the concept of ergonomicss.. , too prvent,, sitons,,, which exceed eml oyees' capabiiies, becat~ l re
seeks ~i~Jy~LpUU1, Luse injuries
occur when employees' capabilities and limitations are exceeded.
Specifically, it is argued that injuries known as cumulative trauma disorders
(CTDs) result from repetitive motion over an extended period of time, and they
are thus also known as repetitive strain injuries or RSIs. Because it is scientifically
unknown how many motions and over what period of time these injuries are caused,
ergonomics tries to discover the predictability factors. Examples of CTDs include
carpal tunnel syndrome, thoracic outlet syndrome, tendonitis, tenosynovitis, and
sprain/strains. Id.
170. For a list'of broad definitions of disabilities more likely to afflict employees
in the workplace, and the limitations that those disabilities create, see id., Limitations
Associated with Specific Disabilities, Accommodating Disabilities (CCH) No. 23,
at 5 (October 1993) (citing Army & Air Force Exchange Service as its source).
For a self-test exercise to determine the essential functions of a taxi driver, see
Accommodating Disabilities (CCH) No. 16, at 3, 6 (March 1993). The analysis of
the "elements" and "qualifications/performance" of that job could be applied to
many other jobs.
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In preparing these job descriptions, some degree of detail is
helpful in determining whether there is a portion of a job that will
require a reasonable accommodation. It has been suggested, however,
that preparing a very detailed job description outlining the physical
requirements in a job function assessement is advisable only when
there is documentation from another source to support the decision.
This other source could be, for example, safety standards required
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
because many positions are already governed by OSHA standards.
Employers should be cautious, however, not to include too. much
detail in job descriptions because of potential exposure to charges
of discrimination on the grounds that a particular detail would be
desirable or helpful, but not an essential function of the job. It is,
therefore, suggested that, in the absence of such other sources of
support, employers should prepare basic job descriptions explaining
the essential elements of the position.17'
Job descriptions have, in fact, become more significant since
the enactment of Title I because they are an important tool to
determine essential job functions. Job descriptions must, therefore,
be constantly updated and must be comprehensive, including all
performance standards and listing physical, sensory, and cognitive
requirements.172
b. Determination of What Reasonable Accommodations
Are Needed
As stated earlier, the EEOC regulations define reasonable
accommodation to mean:
1) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process
that would enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be
considered for the position he is seeking;
2) modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or
to the manner or circumstances under which the position the employee
holds or seeks is customarily performed, that would enable a qualified
individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the
job; and
171. Should Job Descriptions Include Detailed Physical Requirements?, Accom-
modating Disabilities (CCH) No. 2, at 5 (February 1992).
172. Accommodating Disabilities (CCH) No. 16, at 9 (March 1993) (citing David
Alexander, President of Auburn Engineers, Inc., Auburn, Alabama).
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3) modifications or adjustments that enable an employee with
a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as
are enjoyed by other similarly situated employees without disabilities.'7
Reasonable accommodations may include, but are not limited
to:
(A) Making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition and modification
of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations
for individuals with disabilities.174
Title I prohibits employers from refusing to allow an employee
with a disability to return to work simply because he is not fully
recovered, unless he cannot perform the essential functions of the
job with or without accommodations. If necessary to accommodate
medical restrictions and limitations of returning injured workers,
employers may be required to eliminate nonessential job functions
as a reasonable accommodation and create "light-duty" positions.
Even though employers are not theoretically obligated to create
separate "light-duty" positions, many already do so.
Many employers, in fact, have adopted the concept of "light-
duty" positions in an effort to reduce workers' compensation liability.
These positions generally place few physical demands on an employee,
requiring him to perform tasks such as answering the telephone and
administrative work. Assignment to these positions is usually for a
limited period of time. 71 In these "light-duty" positions, employees
with disabilities do not perform the essential functions of their job. 76
173. ADA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. IV 1992); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(1)(i)-(iii) (1993).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. IV 1992).
175. TAM, supra note 57, at IX-4 to -5.
176. Should Light-Duty Job Policies Be Revamped?, Accommodating Disabilities
(CCH) No. 4, at 5 (April 1992). It is suggested that placing returning injured
workers in "light-duty" jobs to avoid workers' compensation costs sets a precedent
for other workers not protected by the ADA to request the same accommodation.
Therefore, employers are encouraged to change their current return-to-duty work
or "light-duty" policies by reorganizing some of their essential and nonessential
functions. Specifically, it is suggested that if a "light-duty" position can be rewritten
or redesigned as a viable permanent job, it should not be considered "light-duty."
After redefining the position, it would become a job having essential functions
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A noteworthy reasonable accommodation that employers are
required to provide under Title I is that of reassigning the injured
worker to a vacant position if one is available that the injured
worker is qualified to perform. It has been said that this obligation
will have the greatest impact upon workers' compensation because,
by requiring placement in a vacant position as a reasonable
accommodation, the ADA obligates employers to review reinstatement
and alternative employment, which is a more extensive requirement
than any state workers' compensation law.' 77 Assigning an injured
worker to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation will
require employers to engage in a two-step process. First, employers
must look at the injured employee's job description as of the date
he seeks to return to work and see whether, in light of his disability,
he can reoccupy that position with or without accommodations. If
he cannot, employers must then review alternate job descriptions of
the same or lower level positions that are currently vacant to determine
whether the injured employee could be reassigned to it. 78 This
requirement to reassign injured workers to vacant positions will also
require employers to coordinate more closely with rehabilitation
specialists to determine whether injured workers protected by the
ADA are able to perform the functions of vacant positions that
already exist or that are expected to exist within a reasonable period
of time. 79
The focus on the employer's obligation to provide reasonable
accommodations seems to be on accommodating individuals with
physical disabilities. While this focus is understandable, employers
must also be sensitive to their obligation to provide reasonable
accommodations to individuals with mental and developmental
disabilities. As in the case of physical disabilities, depending upon
the nature and severity of the disability, it may not be possible to
provide reasonable accommodations for these employees. 8' Employers
within a person's physical capability. Id.
In a recent case, Donelson Hospital in Nashville, Tennessee was found liable
for the discriminatory discharge of a nurse with a back injury, even though she
was able to perform light-duty nursing duties. Tuck v. HCA Health Servs. of
Tenn., Inc., 7 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 1993).
177. ADA Employment Regs Hit Workers' Comp, Accommodating Disabilities
(CCH) No. 2, at 3 (February 1992).
178. Id.
179. Id. See also Renee L. Cyr, Note, The Americans With Disabilities Act:
Implications for Job Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible Em-
ployees, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 1237 (1991-92).
180. For suggestions of possible accommodations for employees with mental
illness and employees with hearing impairments, see Accommodating Disabilities,
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must be aware, however, that their obligation under the ADA applies
equally to the large number of persons suffering from mental or
developmental disabilities.
D. Impact of the ADA on "Exclusivity" Clauses
Title I provides that filing a workers' compensation claim does
not prevent an injured worker from filing a charge of discrimination
under the ADA. Therefore, "exclusivity" clauses in state workers'
compensation laws barring all other civil remedies related to an
injury that has been compensated by a workers' compensation system 8'
do not preclude a qualified individuals with a disability from filing
a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or filing a suit in federal
court under the ADA.182 This interplay between the two statutes
results from a situation in which an employee receives workers'
compensation benefits for a work-related injury or disease and then
charges the employer with discrimination on the basis of his disability
under the ADA because of the employer's refusal to reemploy him
or to make reasonable accommodations.8 3 This seeming conflict
between the two statutes can, however, be reconciled. Exclusive
remedy provisions in state workers' compensation apply only to civil
actions against the employer for employment-related injuries.
Therefore, a charge of disability discrimination would not be
inconsistent because it would not be seeking additional recovery for
supra note 70, Mental Illness in the Workplace, July 1992, at 4-5. See also Id.
Accommodations for the Hearing-Impaired Employee, Accommodating Disabilities
(CCH) No. 6, at 7 (April 1992); Peter David Blanck, Empirical Study of the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Methods, Preliminary
Findings, and Implications, 22 N.M. L. REV. 119 (1992).
A network, called Job Accommodation Network (JAN), operated by the Pres-
ident's Committee on Employment of Individuals with Disabilities, provides assis-
tance to employers in accommodating disabilities. Accommodating Disabilities, supra
note 92, Viewpoint-Need Accommodation Ideas? Don't Overlook JAN, Dec. 1992,
at 1.
181. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-105(a) (Michie Supp. 1993) (reinforcing the
dcrctrine of exclusive remedy by prohibiting employees from filing a civil actiorr
against their employer for employment-related injuries).
182. TAM, supra note 57, at IX-7.
183. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK
§ 5.12 Workers' Compensation Preemption, at 22-23 (1993 Cumulative Supplement
No. 1) (citing Hartman v. Mathis & Bolinger Furniture Co., 282 Cal. Reptr. 35
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that exclusive remedy provision of state workers'
compensation did not bar claim of discrimination on the basis of disability under
state law)).
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an injury. Rather, it would be seeking recovery for an employer's
alleged failure to comply with the requirements of Title I. An injured
worker not allowed to return to work because of discrimination
based on race or sex could similarly receive damages for such
discrimination in addition to workers' compensation.
V. CONCLUSION
It is unquestionable that the ADA significantly changes em-
ployment law. It also affects workers' compensation law in several
ways. First, the ADA requires employers to make a conditional
employment offer to a job applicant before investigating the ap-
plicant's physical and mental condition and obtaining any other
relevant information necessary to preserve the misrepresentation de-
fense or to determine the existence of an SIF case. Thus, the change
brought about by the ADA in these two settings is that employers
can no longer determine the condition of the applicant through
employment applications or pre-offer medical examinations and in-
quiries as was customary before the enactment of the ADA. Second,
the ADA protects employees injured on the job and returning injured
workers if their injury constitutes a "disability" under the ADA.
This means that employers must now first determine whether the
injured worker would be protected by the ADA. If so, employers
must then determine the resulting obligations that the ADA imposes
on them. Third, the ADA imposes an obligation on employers to
provide reasonable accommodations for employees injured on the
job or returning injured workers who are "disabled" within the
meaning of the ADA. These accommodations could range from
slightly modifying work schedules or the duties of the job to installing
mechanical or technological equipment, or making structural and
architectural modifications of the facilities to allow these employees
to return to the workplace. Fourth, the ADA provides that filing
a workers' compensation claim does not prevent an injured worker
from filing a charge of discrimination on the basis of a disability
under the ADA. Consequently, the "exclusivity" clause in workers'
compensation laws barring all other civil remedies related to an
injury that has been compensated by a workers' compensation system
does not apply when recovery is sought to redress discrimination
on the basis of disability.
Title I of the ADA has created anxiety among employers because
it is, indeed, sweeping civil rights legislation that requires significant
changes in the hiring and employment practices that were customary
before its enactment. Although some of these required changes will
be financially burdensome for employers, most will be principally
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administratively and operationally burdensome during the imple-
mentation period. When assessing the need for and nature of these
changes, employers must remember the goal of the ADA: to prohibit
discrimination against individuals with disabilities solely because of
their disability. Understanding this basic goal should aid employers
in their efforts to comply with the intricate provisions of Title I.
In prohibiting discrimination, the ADA creates opportunities for
both employees and employers. Individuals with disabilities can now
enjoy full and equal employment opportunities generally available
only to nondisabled individuals before the enactment of the ADA.
Employers will face the economic and noneconomic costs of "rea-
sonable accommodations" as well as possible liability. But employers,
too, will benefit from the ADA in that injured employees who might
never have been able to return to work will now have a much better
chance of doing so because of accommodations for their disability.
More specifically, by forcing employers to develop disability man-
agement policies, the ADA may become a vehicle for reducing
workers' compensation costs. Although some employers are con-
cerned that the ADA will increase workers' compensation costs
because workers with a disability may be more likely to sustain an
injury or aggravate a preexisting disability, careful evaluation of the
physical and mental abilities of the employee relative to the re-
quirements of the job should provide considerable protection. The
benefits to be derived in the workplace from jobs that are better
designed not only for employees with disabilities but also, perhaps
indirectly, for nondisabled employees should outweigh the perceived
negative effects of the ADA.
If the ADA has the effect it was intended to have, society as
a whole should also benefit because millions of individuals with
disabilities can now become independent and productive members
of society. From the perspective of society as a whole, the economic
advantages from increased national productivity and reduced welfare
costs may well exceed the costs imposed on employers by the ADA.
The principal societal benefit, however, may not be economic. By
bringing individuals with disabilities into the mainstream of American
life, society may find itself enriched in ways that most of us had
never envisioned: by new business and social relationships with these
individuals.
It is still too early to assess the impact of the ADA. It may
prove to be a breeding ground for litigation, resulting in ill will
and unnecessary costs, as some fear. But, in years to come, it may
appear as an important milestone toward a society that is more
productive, kinder, and gentler.
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